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Smoking Status and Public Responses to 
Ambiguous Scientific Risk Evidence 
W. Kip Viscusi,* Wesley A. Magat,t and Joel Hubert 
Situations in which individuals receive information seldom involve scientific consensus over 
the level of the risk. When scientific experts disagree, people may process the information in 
an unpredictable manner. The original data presented here for environmental risk judgments 
indicate a tendency to place disproportionate weight on the high risk assessment, irrespective 
of its source, particularly when the experts disagree. Cigarette smokers differ in their risk 
information processing from nonsmokers in that they place less weight on the high risk judg- 
ment when there is a divergence in expert opinion. Consequently, they are more likely to simply 
average competing risk assessments. 
1. Introduction 
Most risks that we face are not known with precision. The risks posed by climate change, 
the cancer risks created by breast implants, the potential for adverse reactions to a new drug, 
and the threat of mad cow disease are all highly uncertain. For example, one prominent British 
scientist offered the rather imprecise risk judgment that the human form of mad cow disease, 
or Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, would kill from 500 to 500,000 British consumers.' Such uncer- 
tainty is the norm rather than the exception. Substantial ambiguity exists regarding the extent 
of the hazard even for risks for which there is substantial agreement, such as the hazards of 
cigarettes. The extent of the health risks posed by environmental tobacco smoke remain hotly 
debated, as some studies indicate substantial risks and others fail to indicate any significant risk. 
How do people respond to situations in which there is a diversity of opinion regarding the 
level of the risk? Ideally, they should make risk inferences in a rational manner; where we will 
take Bayesian learning as the rationality reference point. When there are competing scientific 
risk judgments, how people process the information will depend on their prior beliefs, the 
precision of their prior beliefs, the risks indicated by the scientific studies, and the weight they 
place on these studies. There are many ways in which people might use such scientific studies, 
such as by averaging their implications or placing a higher weight on the more credible study. 
Some of these changes in risk beliefs in response to new information will be consistent with 
rational learning, whereas others may not. In this paper, we present original survey evidence in 
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which respondents consider a variety of information scenarios, making it possible to assess the 
consistency of the treatment of different scientific risk studies. 
To the extent that behavioral predictions are possible based on evidence in the literature, 
it would suggest that people may exhibit anomalous behavior when there is ambiguity regarding 
the magnitude of the risk. Consider, for example, the implications of the classic Ellsberg (1961) 
paradox. In that experiment, subjects considered two urns, one of which offered a known prob- 
ability of winning a prize, whereas the other offered an uncertain chance of winning a prize. 
Respondents were averse to ambiguous chances of winning the prize, compared to a lottery 
ticket with precisely known probabilities and the same mean probability value. Researchers 
have identified similar phenomena with respect to small probabilities of a loss, because there 
is often a tendency toward ambiguity aversion that is not consistent with rational expected 
utility theory. 
The issues addressed in this paper represent a variant on this ambiguous risk structure. 
Moreover, we have coupled the presence of risk ambiguity with different risk information sourc- 
es, whereas in earlier studies, such as Viscusi and Magat (1987), there is no difference in the 
source's identity. Suppose that there are two different parties providing risk information, and 
their views are different. How do people process the divergent risk judgments? Consider the 
situation of an industrial polluter, which might be expected to have a vested economic interest 
in downplaying the risk or even misrepresenting it. To what extent does it matter whether the 
risk evidence is from industry or government? When is individual differentiation between those 
risk sources entirely rational, and is there any reason to believe that people fail to process 
diverse risk information rationally? 
The substantive focus of the study will be on how people respond to different assessments 
of the risk of cancer due to air pollution. Cancer is a chief source of individual risk that is often 
ambiguous. The use of an air pollution context enables us to consider risk estimates in the 
policy arena, including both business and government. In each case, respondents will consider 
two different sources of risk information about the potential cancer risk. These informational 
sources could be both government or industry sources, or possibly a mixture of industry and 
government sources. Because the polluting firm will have less of an incentive to reveal accurate 
risk information about the hazards it generates than might the government, an interesting eco- 
nomic issue is how people will process these divergent risk judgments depending on their source 
and the risk levels associated with them. Unequal weighting of such scientific evidence may be 
entirely rational. In the case of our study, however, respondents will consider a variety of 
different informational combinations. Ideally, people should be consistent in how they weight 
risk evidence across different risk scenarios. 
The key issue we explore here is how risk judgments and relative weighting of diverse 
scientific evidence varies with personal characteristics. Demographic factors may be conse- 
quential. Women, for example, have shown themselves to be more averse to facing health 
hazards than are men.2 A personal characteristic of particular saliency is individual smoking 
status. Do people who have self-selected themselves into this extremely dangerous consumption 
activity process risk information differently than do nonsmokers with similar demographic pro- 
files? The analysis of the distinctive behavior of cigarette smokers with respect to this infor- 
mational context is of interest since cigarette smoking involves a risk for which there are 
2 Hersch (1996) documents a variety of salient gender differences in attitudes toward health risks. 
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continuing battles between the cigarette industry and government officials focused on the haz- 
ards of environmental tobacco smoke. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical structure for 
the study and the empirical formulation of the model that will be tested. Section 3 presents the 
empirical estimates of the effect of the different risk information sources and the different risk 
levels on individual risk judgments. Section 4 focuses on the role of smoking status and its 
effect on the processing of risk information. As indicated in the concluding section 5, individuals 
do not treat the different kinds of information based solely on the credibility of the source. 
Rather, they tend to place disproportionate weight on the high risk assessment, particularly when 
there are conflicting risk judgments. Cigarette smokers are less likely to exhibit such alarmist 
behavior. 
2. Theoretical Structure and Empirical Framework 
Theoretical Structure 
The basis for the study is a survey of adults in which they considered moving to one of 
two areas, area 1 or area 2. Each area posed a risk of cancer, but they differed in terms of how 
the risk was characterized. Area 1 posed an uncertain cancer risk level S for which there were 
two divergent risk judgments involving industry, government, or a mix of sources. Area 2 has 
cancer risk level R that is estimated with precision and will thus serve as the reference point 
for the level of the precisely understood risk that is equivalent to uncertain risks. The survey 
proceeded iteratively using an interactive computer program until respondents identified the 
known risk R in area 2 that they believed was equivalent to the ambiguous risk in area 1. 
The advantage of considering a move to an undefined new area is that respondents will 
not bring to bear their prior beliefs regarding their current risk situation. Each area was, in 
effect, an abstraction for which there was only survey information regarding the area's chemical 
hazards based on two different studies. The study could consequently be a pure informational 
experiment in which all that transpired was an effort by respondents to find a known risk value 
that was equivalent to an area in which there were two studies that differed in terms of the 
implied risk level. 
The nature of the informational context is noteworthy as well. For personal risk-taking 
activities, such as smoking, some researchers have hypothesized that people may discount risk 
evidence for a risky activity they have chosen. Air pollution, which is the case study for this 
analysis, is a hazard outside of the individual's control. This risk is involuntary and inflicted 
by a polluting industry in which the respondent has no economic interest. Moreover, air pollution 
is a public hazard that poses similar exposures to all, although the actual risks may differ if, 
for example, one is asthmatic. The survey design consequently avoids any influence of risk 
perceptions being influenced by a desire to justify relatively great personal risk taking. 
The two information sources were scientists from the polluting chemical industry (denoted 
by i) and scientists from the government (denoted by g). Respondents received no information 
about the nature of the scientific studies or their timeliness, so there was no reason otherwise 
to differentiate between them. The Appendix presents sample survey questions. 
If we let U denote utility in the healthy state and V denote utility with cancer, the task is 
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for respondents to find the value of the known risk R in area 2 that gives them the same expected 
utility in both locations, or 
(1 - S) U + SV= (1 - R)U + RV. (1) 
From the standpoint of the survey structure, respondents are picking the known risk R that 
satisfies 
R = S. (2) 
Thus, the structure of the utility functions and the character of the rewards structure are not 
consequential because the U and V terms drop out. For this binary lottery, the task is simply 
to find the precisely understood probability R that is equivalent to the subjective risk assessment 
S in terms of the attractiveness of the chance of getting cancer in that area. 
The nature of the study makes the value of the equivalent precise risk R observable, because 
that precise risk value is simply the cancer in area 2, where the risk is known. By construction, 
the survey determines the value of R that is equal to the respondent's subjective risk assessment 
S, which is not observable. Thus, for S we know the two pieces of risk information that are 
provided to respondents, which are the low and high risk estimates. Although we do not know 
how respondents use the information in altering their subjective risk assessment S, we know 
that the result of this process is to get S equal to R, thus making possible an empirical analysis 
of how people form their risk beliefs. 
To impose some structure on the learning process, we will adopt what we call a "naive 
Bayesian" model, in which respondents treat both risk estimates as independent sources of 
information. For concreteness, let risk perceptions be characterized by the beta distribution, 
which can assume a wide variety of skewed and symmetric shapes. Suppose that people have 
prior beliefs p regarding the cancer risk, with associated precision aoo. Thus, the informational 
content of the prior belief is equivalent to drawing xa0 balls from a Benoulli urn, for which a 
fraction p indicate a cancer risk. The low-risk information from source j (either industry i or 
government g) indicates a cancer risk Slj with associated precision a,j. Similarly, the high risk 
information indicates a cancer risk s2k with associated precision a2k (either industry i or gov- 
ernment g). We will refer to information that has a higher precision parameter as being more 
"credible." A key assumption of this naive Bayesian model is that the informational weight 
does not depend on the risk probability value disclosed. Note that there is no requirement that 
people treat the industry and government sources as being equally credible. 
The posterior risk assessment S is a linear weighted average of the different probabilities, or 
S= + (s + + +. (3) 
aOt + Oat + O + oO + aljj + n 2k 0 o + ot f- + O2k a2 
The weights on p, slj, and s2k are the respective fractions of the total information reflected by 
each information source, where these fractions sum to 1.0. 
By design, the experimental manipulation gave respondents evidence from two studies and 
did not indicate any overlap between them. If the studies were overlapping and not independent, 
the interpretation of the information weights changes somewhat, but one is still led to a linear 
formulation such as that in Equation 3.3 For example, assuming a normal distribution rather 
than a beta distribution, the weights on the two risk studies are the amount of information 
3 See Zeckhauser (1971) and Viscusi (1997) for further analysis of the overlapping case. 
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unique to the two risk studies divided by the total amount of nonoverlapping information. 
Similarly, in Equation 3 the weights are the fraction of the total information associated with 
each information source. Thus, the presence of overlapping information simply alters the inter- 
pretation of the coefficients. 
A variety of symmetry conditions emerge from this formulation. The key property driving 
these results is that the informational value of a given source is independent of the other 
information source (i.e., nonoverlapping information). Let Low(j, k) denote the information 
weight on the low risk assessment when the low risk value is from source j and the high risk 
value is from source k. The high risk information weight High(j, k) is defined analogously. If 
the same party is providing both risk judgments, the information weights should be the same 
because there is no reason given in the survey for why a high or low risk value from an identical 
source should differ in terms of credibility. Consequently, 
Low(i, i) = High(i, i), (4) 
and 
Low(g, g) = High(g, g). (5) 
When there are two information sources, the weights implied by Equation 3 always give the 
same weight on a particular party's risk information, whether it is the high or low risk judgment, 
or 
Low(g, i) = High(i, g), (6) 
and 
Low(i, g) = High(g, i). (7) 
Equally credible information for both parties, which is the situation in which the precision 
parameter is the same for both parties, leads to Low(j, k) = High(j, k) in all instances. 
Deriving Equations 4-7 simply involves implementing Equation 3 for the specific case 
indicated. The precision parameter depends on the information source, not on the implied risk 
value, so the informational content of a government study is Otg and is ac for an industry study. 
Thus, we have 
Low(i, i) = cxi/(o0 + cxi + a,o), (8) 
which is identical to High(i, i). Similarly, 
Low(g, i) = oxg/(ao + Otg + xOt), (9) 
and 
High(i, g) = ag/(axo + xi + cxg), (10) 
which satisfies Equation 6. The other conditions also follow in a straightforward manner. 
One could envision more complicated learning processes that were rational and did not 
satisfy the properties of this naive Bayesian model. People's processing of risk evidence may 
depend not only on the party making the assessment but also on the risk estimate. For example, 
results from industry studies may have a greater effect when the estimates are high if people 
believe that the industry would conceal unfavorable information unless it was particularly com- 
pelling. The empirical analysis will permit a broad analysis of such influences. However, the 
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interpretation of whether results imply a form of irrationality hinges on adoption of the naive 
Bayesian model specified above. 
Empirical Formulation 
Implementing Equation 3 empirically is straightforward. The dependent variable is the 
equilibrating known risk R that respondents equated to their subjective risk assessments S for 
the area with uncertain risk assessments. Thus, for purposes of estimating Equation 3 empiri- 
cally, the dependent variable equals R. The prior beliefs term in Equation 3 is not observable, 
but it can be captured by a constant term Po and a linear function 1[X of a vector X of personal 
characteristics. However, the information weight ao/(xa + a,j + c2k) depends on the identity of 
the two information sources, as these affect the values of a,j and t2k in the denominator. To 
capture this influence, separate dummy variables will be included for the particular information 
source combination (e.g., industry for the low risk study and government for the high risk 
study), thus permitting the value of 30 to vary. The coefficients 32 of the low risk estimate s, 
and the coefficient f3 of the high risk estimate s2 represent the relative informational content 
of those risk assessments as well. These values will also be permitted to vary to reflect the 
particular information combination that is present. Abstracting from the complications arising 
because the coefficients vary with information combination (j, k), the estimating equation is of 
the form 
S = Po + ,1x + P2S1 + 13S2 + E, (11) 
where E is a random error term. The values of P1, 12, and P3 will be invariant with respect to 
(j, k) in the case of separate regressions performed within different (j, k) information combi- 
nations. However, in runs using the pooled data, these 12 and P3 parameters will be permitted 
to vary with each of the information source combinations (j, k). If we let the government- 
government information case be the baseline situation, or the omitted dummy variable group, 
the pooled estimating equation is 
S = o3 + P3(i, i) + P,(g, i) + Po(i, g) + PiX + 2S1 + P2(i, i)sI + 32(g, i)sl 
+ 2(i, g)s + 1 + 3s 3(i, i)s2 + 3(g, i)s2 + P3(i, g)s2 + e. (12) 
Even permitting the relative information weights to vary with the information type may 
not be a sufficiently general formulation. The information content parameters ax, axj, and c2k 
in Equation 3 may vary with personal characteristics. Section 4 will explore the most salient 
of these interactions, which is the relationship between smoking status and the information 
weights. 
The Data Base 
The sample used in this study consisted of 143 adult participants, who were recruited by 
a market research firm to participate in the study. The Appendix summarizes the sample char- 
acteristics. Respondents took the survey using a computer program that proceeded interactively 
until the equilibrating R value was obtained. The sequence of pairwise comparisons varied 
depending on the respondent's previous answers so as to produce convergence. The computer 
format also eliminates interviewer bias and may produce more accurate responses to sensitive 
questions dealing with personal characteristics, such as age. 
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Table 1. Mean Indifference Points for Respondents by Information Source 
Information Source Combinations 
Scenario Overall Mean (i, i) (g, g) (i, g) (g, i) 
(80,100) 94.92 100.26 91.49 99.00 89.90 
(10,200) 112.90 107.78 115.59 125.03 107.35 
(100,300) 208.71 200.61 210.61 221.25 213.11 
(200,400) 310.63 295.92 332.88 318.88 315.74 
(615,735) 689.69 695.38 666.89 623.75 722.20 
(100,900) 548.53 551.54 605.51 547.06 504.59 
As is indicated in the sample questions in the Appendix, the respective risks in area 1 and 
area 2 were for "the chance of getting cancer from the pollution in each area." The different 
information combinations received by respondents were two government studies (g, g), two 
industry studies (i, i), an industry low risk study with a government high risk study (i, g) and 
a government low risk study with an industry high risk study (g, i). 
The different levels of cancer risks varied across subjects and information sources. The 
survey included six different risk combinations for each information source combination, where 
the risks were in terms of cases of cancer per million residents in area 1: (100, 300), (200, 
400), (100, 900), (10, 200), (80, 100), and (615, 735). 
Table 1 provides a summary of the mean responses for each of the six scenarios and each 
of the four informational combinations. In every case, the overall mean responses were some- 
what greater than the midpoint of the range of the two studies. The risk range varied both in 
absolute and percentage terms because the nature of the responses was not clear a priori. For 
example, in comparing the responses to (100, 300) to (100, 900), one might hypothesize that 
people would focus more on the high risk estimate when the studies become more disparate. 
Or they might simply dismiss the high risk estimate if the low risk value was from a more 
credible source, as in the case of the (g, i) results for (100, 900), for which the response is 505, 
which is well below the overall sample mean. Because of the substantial differences in responses 
across individuals, the subsequent regression results are more illuminating in highlighting the 
patterns of interest. 
3. Empirical Results for Basic Learning Models 
The regression estimates of equation 12 appear in Table 2. These estimates are for the 
entire sample, where results from the different types of information provided to the respondents 
are pooled in a single regression. In each case, the dependent variable is the equilibrating risk 
(i.e., the number of cancer cases per one million population) in area 2 that the respondent found 
to be indifferent to the situation in area 1, in which two risk assessments were provided. Sub- 
sequent results will disaggregate the findings by information group, but there are no significant 
differences between the pooled and aggregate results.4 
Column 1 in Table 2 includes the basic elements of the risk belief model. In recognition 
of the individual's prior risk beliefs, the equation includes an intercept term as well as a series 
4 The pertinent F-tests suggest that pooling is appropriate. 
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of personal characteristic variables pertaining to the respondent's age, race, gender, years of 
schooling, income level, and marital status. Column 1 in Table 2 permits the intercept term to 
vary across different information combinations. The equation includes dummy variables for the 
particular information group in which the respondent participated. For example, government- 
industry pertains to the situation in which the low risk value was from the government, and the 
high risk assessment was from industry. Thus, the informational content provided by the sci- 
entific studies can potentially influence the degree to which prior risk beliefs affect the overall 
risk perception by altering the relative weight accorded to one's prior beliefs. 
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. Use of 
ordinary least squares to estimate the regression in a situation in which the dependent variable 
is bounded (i.e., it cannot be below zero) creates potential problems of heteroskedasticity; as a 
result we also report the heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors in brackets.5 Moreover, 
appropriate calculation of the standard errors must also take into account that respondents con- 
sidered multiple risk information scenarios. To account for such influences, the bracketed stan- 
dard errors are the robust and clustered standard errors shown in brackets, which were calculated 
using the procedure described in Huber (1967). The linear model in Equation 12 offers the 
strength that it is directly linked to the theoretical structure in Equation 3, which is also linear. 
From a Bayesian learning standpoint, the principal variables of interest in Table 2 are the 
coefficients on the low and high risk variables. These weights simply represent the relative 
proportion of risk information associated with the low and high risk information; that is, the 
fraction of the available information linked to each source. Based on the theoretical model in 
Equation 3 above, these proportions will sum to 1.0 if no weight is given to the prior belief 
and will be less than 1.0 if there is some nonzero proportion of the informational content 
accorded to the prior. If the two risk assessments are treated symmetrically, then these coeffi- 
cients will be equal. In the extreme situation in which respondents view the risk studies as 
being the dominant source of information and the prior risk beliefs have no role whatsoever, 
the sum of the low and high risk coefficients will equal 1.0. If prior risk beliefs are conse- 
quential, then the sum of the low and high risk coefficients will be less than 1.0. The estimated 
sum of these coefficients is 1.01 (column 1), but this value is not significantly different from 
1.0.6 This result is consistent with the prediction of the Bayesian learning model that the in- 
formational weights on the low and high risk information sources should sum to a value less 
than or equal to 1.0. One can, however, reject the hypothesis that the information weights are 
equal, because the high risk weight is greater.7 The naive Bayesian model's symmetric treatment 
of information can be rejected. People do not treat the information with equal weight but, 
instead, accord a greater weight to the higher risk judgment. The information source dummy 
variables are not statistically significant so prior beliefs are not affected by the source, as is 
consistent with the theory. 
5 For the analogous linear probability models, estimates of the coefficients will not be efficient so that a heteroskedasticity 
adjustment is appropriate. See Maddala (1983, pp. 15-16). In our case, the dependent variable is not a 0-1 dichotomous 
variable, nor is it censored or truncated, as the values of the variable should naturally fall in the interval [0, 1]. There 
were no predicted values outside the [0, 1] range, so the endpoint constraints were not binding. 
6 To explore whether the value of the sum of the two risk coefficients was different from 1.0, column 1 in Table 2 was 
reestimated, replacing Low Risk and High Risk by (Low Risk + High Risk)/2. The estimated coefficient is 1.038 with 
an associated standard error of 0.021, so that 1.0 is within the confidence interval. 
7 One can reject the hypothesis that the Low Risk and High Risk coefficients are equal, as the associated F-statistic is 
10.52 and the critical F.05(1884) is 3.84. 
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Table 2. Risk Perception Regression Results for Pooled Information Groupsa 
Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
[Robust and Clustered Standard Errors] 
Intercept 
Low Risk 
High Risk 
Industry-Industry 
Government-Industry 
Industry-Government 
Low Risk x Industry-Industry 
High Risk x Industry-Industry 
Low Risk x Government-Industry 
High Risk x Government-Industry 
Low Risk x Industry-Government 
High Risk X Industry-Government 
Age 
Age Missing 
Nonwhite or Other 
Male 
1 
30.327 
(26.622) 
[40.303] 
0.455* 
(0.022) 
[0.023] 
0.559* 
(0.015) 
[0.019] 
0.895 
(9.093) 
[6.739] 
11.755 
(10.576) 
[8.357] 
2.815 
(11.898) 
[8.654] 
-0.556 
(0.315) 
[0.562] 
2.322 
(21.596) 
[49.519] 
23.982* 
(7.935) 
[14.478] 
-15.969 
(7.900) 
[14.231] 
2 
41.294 
(28.347) 
[39.612] 
0.577* 
(0.039) 
[0.054] 
0.498* 
(0.026) 
[0.030] 
-7.912 
(16.551) 
[12.088] 
-5.826 
(19.208) 
[13.552] 
15.869 
(21.734) 
[15.471] 
-0.113 
(0.054) 
[0.078] 
0.064 
(0.038) 
[0.049] 
-0.244* 
(0.058) 
[0.082] 
0.139* 
(0.040) 
[0.062] 
-0.236* 
(0.077) 
[0.125] 
0.057 
(0.051) 
[0.065] 
-0.533 
(0.314) 
[0.537] 
0.792 
(21.572) 
[47.402] 
20.307 
(8.138) 
[14.177] 
-14.785 
(7.859) 
[13.476] 
3 
31.041 
(28.502) 
[40.260] 
0.581* 
(0.041) 
[0.061] 
0.520* 
(0.027) 
[0.029] 
-7.800 
(16.498) 
[12.069] 
-5.488 
(19.146) 
[13.475] 
17.761 
(21.674) 
[15.694] 
-0.119 
(0.054) 
[0.077] 
0.067 
(0.037) 
[0.049] 
-0.246* 
(0.058) 
[0.082] 
0.139* 
(0.040) 
[0.062] 
-0.241* 
(0.077) 
[0.127] 
0.054 
(0.051) 
[0.066] 
-0.531 
(0.313) 
[0.538] 
0.676 
(21.502) 
[47.430] 
20.304 
(8.111) 
[14.192] 
-14.664 
(7.833) 
[13.468] 
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Table 2. Continued 
Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
[Robust and Clustered Standard Errors] 
1 2 3 
Education -0.328 -0.522 -0.513 
(1.440) (1.433) (1.428) 
[2.337] [2.391] [2.393] 
Income 4.9E-5 2.2E-5 1.9E-5 
(17.9E-5) (17.9E-5) (17.9E-5) 
[22.1E-5] [21.6E-5] [21.6E-5] 
Income Missing -5.423 -9.805 -9.882 
(13.531) (13.448) (13.404) 
[19.532] [19.973] [19.965] 
Single -27.074* -19.531 -19.506 
(8.361) (8.392) (8.364) 
[11.899] [12.026] [12.036] 
Smoker -19.687* 14.293 
(8.718) (15.150) 
[11.737] [9.219] 
Smoker X Low Risk -0.003 
(0.047) 
[0.047] 
Smoker x High Risk -0.076* 
(0.033) 
[0.040] 
R2 0.81 0.82 0.82 
Asterisks denote coefficients that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, one-tailed test, using the 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. 
aThe sample size is 858 for all columns. 
Column 2 in Table 2 explores the character of the influences on risk beliefs in much greater 
detail. In particular, both the low and high risk coefficients interact with three of the four 
informational sets to reflect the possible different information weights for the parties. The omit- 
ted interaction is for the g-g combination. These differences are statistically significant, because 
one can reject the hypothesis that this set of interactions is zero.8 This informational combination 
forms the baseline risk coefficient estimates in column 2, as respondents place a relative weight 
of 0.58 on the low risk information provided by the government and a weight of 0.50 on the 
high risk information provided by the government. 
To obtain comparable estimates of the effect of different information sources on the in- 
formational weights, one must add the coefficient of the interaction term to these low and high 
risk coefficients. As it turns out, it matters a great deal who has provided the risk information. 
In the case of the i-i interaction set for which all information is from industry, the low risk 
weight is less than that for the g-g combination, and the high risk weight is higher than the g- 
g combination. These differences are statistically significant for the unweighted standard errors 
but not for the heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. The relative weight on the high risk 
information is 0.56, compared with a relative weight of 0.46 on the low risk information. The 
8 The pertinent F-statistic for the constraint imposed by column 1 compared with column 2 in Table 2 is 4.22, and the 
critical F005(7837) value is 2.03. 
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point estimates for the i-i mix of information leads to a higher weight on the high risk outcome 
than the low risk outcome, which is a reversal of the pattern observed for the g-g information 
set. 
The differences become particularly stark and statistically significant once there is a mix 
of risk information sources. In the case of the g-i risk information combination, the low risk 
information provided by the government has a much lower weight than in the g-g combination, 
and the high risk information provided by the industry has a more substantial weight. If the 
polluting industry itself believes the risk is likely to be high, people are particularly likely to 
believe that estimate as opposed to a lower risk estimate by the government. The net result is 
that in the g-i situation, the informational weight placed on the government risk information is 
0.33, and the weight placed on the industry information is 0.64, or almost twice as much. In 
the situation where there is a discrepancy between the information sources, the industry infor- 
mation at the high risk end receives a very high weight, even higher than in the situation in 
which the industry was the source of both the low and high risk information. Perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly, the high risk assessment by industry is more consequential when the low risk 
assessment is given by the government risk experts, compared with experts from the polluting 
firm. 
The final variant of information that is provided is the i-g risk information case. Do people 
dismiss the polluting industry's risk estimate when the government studies suggest the risk is 
higher than do the industry's? The low risk weight for the industry risk information in the i-g 
situation is smaller than the weight placed on the government low risk information in the g-g 
case. The net effect is that the relative weight placed on the industry low risk information in 
the i-g case is 0.34, and the relative weight placed on the government low risk information is 
0.57. 
Respondents treat the high risk information as being more informative. This pattern is 
borne out in the interaction results, especially in the g-i and i-g cases in which there are different 
information sources. This predilection for treating worst case scenarios as more consequential 
is consistent with observed biases in government risk regulation programs as well, because 
these risk policies tend to be guided by the maximum risk level or the upper end of the 95% 
confidence level of the risk range (see Nichols and Zeckhauser 1986; Viscusi 1992a). Individual 
respondents display a similar orientation in that fear of the worst case scenario receives greater 
weight than does the low risk assessment. 
This pattern reflects what one might view as risk aversion in learning. When faced with a 
lottery on two risk assessments, the informationally risk-averse respondents have a certainty 
equivalent probability that is higher than the expected value because of the disproportionate 
weight on the high risk assessment.9 Such risk aversion in learning appears more prevalent when 
different parties are the sources of the conflicting judgments. This phenomenon is, however, 
independent of the shape of individual preferences and the presence of risk aversion for changes 
in wealth. 
Table 3 reports the regression estimates for Equation 11 for each risk information subsam- 
ple. These results parallel the earlier findings almost identically. In the g-g risk information 
case, the low risk information weight is 0.58, and the high risk information weight is 0.50. The 
i-i informational weights are almost identical to those implied by Table 1: the low risk weight 
9 With normal risk aversion, 11 individuals facing a lottery will attach to it a certain monetary equivalent below its 
expected value. 
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Table 3. Risk Perception Regression Results for Different Information Groups 
Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
[Robust and Clustered Standard Errors] 
Government- Industry- Government- Industry- 
Government Industry Industry Government 
Intercept 
Low Risk 
High Risk 
Age 
Age Missing 
Nonwhite 
or Other 
Male 
Education 
Income 
Income Missing 
Single 
Smoker 
R2 
N 
46.244 
(43.308) 
[36.774] 
0.582* 
(0.036) 
[0.055] 
0.498* 
(0.024) 
[0.030] 
-0.506 
(0.509) 
[0.613] 
-29.714 
(34.826) 
[56.151] 
30.688* 
(13.175) 
[16.168] 
-13.188 
(12.697) 
[13.668] 
-0.690 
(2.320) 
[2.018] 
4.3E-5 
(29.0E-5) 
[24.0E-5] 
-19.778 
(21.796) 
[20.297] 
-25.637* 
(13.554) 
[14.528] 
-31.182* 
(14.105) 
[14.983] 
0.83 
286 
72.783 
(48.499) 
[58.378] 
0.467* 
(0.039) 
[0.060] 
0.561* 
(0.029) 
[0.039] 
-0.720 
(0.565) 
[0.665] 
-1.475 
(38.823) 
[54.328] 
12.966 
(14.658) 
[17.773] 
- 16.097 
(14.257) 
[15.859] 
-2.742 
(2.586) 
[3.421] 
3.7E-5 
(32.5E-5) 
[25.4E-5] 
11.638 
(24.269) 
[23.533] 
-21.570 
(15.024) 
[14.824] 
-24.560* 
(15.728) 
[12.466] 
0.81 
286 
-7.689 
(65.626) 
[57.600] 
0.329* 
(0.048) 
[0.055] 
0.640* 
(0.034) 
[0.050] 
-0.048 
(0.779) 
[0.772] 
41.326 
(52.844) 
[47.444] 
15.233 
(19.751) 
[20.742] 
-26.356 
(19.366) 
[19.327] 
1.108 
(3.649) 
[3.761] 
4.1E-5 
(43.2E-5) 
[27.7E-5] 
-2.909 
(33.037) 
[29.243] 
-15.174 
(21.134) 
[18.249] 
-2.163 
(20.879) 
[15.278] 
0.83 
168 
8.326 
(71.663) 
[69.008] 
0.341* 
(0.068) 
[0.101] 
0.555* 
(0.045) 
[0.055] 
-0.815 
(0.839) 
[0.613] 
20.248 
(59.116) 
[47.726] 
22.395 
(22.488) 
[19.738] 
-0.277 
(20.812) 
[23.282] 
2.922 
(3.679) 
[4.257] 
2.4E-5 
(50.9E-5) 
[38.2E-5] 
-43.830 
(36.167) 
[47.805] 
-4.403 
(22.384) 
[22.122] 
-5.576 
(24.512) 
[24.777] 
0.78 
118 
Asterisks denote coefficients that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, one-tailed test, using the 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. 
is 0.47, and the high risk weight is 0.56. Similarly, the g-i low risk weight is 0.33, and the 
high risk weight is 0.64, as in the pooled regression case; in the i-g case the low risk weight 
is 0.34, and the high risk weight is 0.56. Permitting all the coefficients to change and not simply 
the risk information variable consequently has negligible effects on the influence of the relative 
informational weights on the two different information sources presented to respondents. 
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There are, however, some notable differences. In particular, the race, marital status, and 
smoking status variables are statistically significant in the g-g case, but only smoking status is 
ever significant in the other separate informational group regression results. Overall, risk per- 
ceptions tend to be higher for nonwhites and for single respondents, and they tend to be lower 
for smokers. 
The nature of the departures from rational behavior is reflected in the character of the 
divergences of the estimates in Table 3 from the predicted parameter relationships. Equations 
4, 5, 6, and 7 above summarize the various symmetry hypotheses for the naive Bayesian model 
on which they are based. This reference point assumes that informational weights depend only 
on the particular source and not on the risk estimate or the other information provided. Con- 
sequentially, "irrational" observed behavior may be consistent with other, more complex ratio- 
nal learning models. The first set of symmetry hypotheses in Equations 4 and 5 state that in 
situations in which both high and low risk information are from the same party, the relative 
informational weights should be identical. The low risk weight is greater in the g-g case, and 
the high risk weight is greater in the i-i cases. These differences are statistically significant in 
both the Low(g, g) and High(g, g) case, as well as for the Low(i, i) and High(i, i).'1 In each 
instance, however, the magnitudes of the differences are not great, as the weights are roughly 
0.5. 
Substantial differences arise once information is provided by different information sources. 
The informational weight conditions characterized by Equations 6 and 7 are each violated." 
Moreover, there is a consistent pattern to the violations because the high risk weight is consis- 
tently larger than the low risk weight irrespective of whether the high risk information is from 
the government or industry. It is not so much the identity of the party conveying the high risk 
information but, rather, the fact that there is a diversity of views. As one would expect, the gap 
between the high and low risk informational weights is greater when the high risk assessment 
is from industry, but in each case there is a substantial spread between the size of the infor- 
mational weights, ranging from 0.23 to 0.30. In situations in which there is a diversity of views, 
respondents place from one and one-half to two times as great a weight on the high risk 
assessment as on the low risk assessment. 
Many of the disparities that are observed reflect consistent patterns of influence. When 
there are different information sources, the low risk weight is not significantly different for 
either Low(g, i) = 0.33 or Low(i, g) = 0.34.12 Similarly, the high risk weights High(g, i) = 
0.64 and High(i, g) = 0.56 are fairly similar in magnitude and not statistically distinguishable.'3 
Similarly, one cannot reject the joint hypothesis that Low(g, i) = Low(i, g) and High(g, i) = 
High(i, g).14 That there is a diversity of opinion seems to be more consequential than the identity 
of the diverse views. The parallels of the estimated low and high risk weights are substantial 
but not complete when both information sources are identical. The high risk weights-High(g, 
g) = 0.50 and High(i, i) = 0.56-are not significantly different, but the low risk weights- 
10 The pertinent F-statistic for the hypothesis that Low(g, g) = High(g, g) is 20.39, which is above the critical F0.05(1837) 
value of 3.84, and the F-value for the hypothesis that Low(i, i) = High(i, i) is 4.89, which is just above the cutoff 
level. 
" More specifically, the F-statistic for the hypothesis that Low(g, i) = High(i, g) is 13.06, and the statistic for the 
hypothesis that High(g, i) = Low(i, g) is 16.39, each of which exceeds the critical F005(1837) value of 3.84. 
12 The pertinent F-statistic is 0.010, which is below the critical F005(1837) value of 3.84. 
'3 The calculated F-statistic is 2.34, which is below the cutoff value of 3.84. 
14 The F-statistic here is 1.47, while the critical F005(2837) is 4.61. 
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Low(g, g) = 0.58 and Low(i, i) = 0.47-do differ.15 From the standpoint of the predictions of 
a rational learning model, these values need not be identical, but they could be in the naive 
Bayesian case in which information from both parties is equally credible. 
The effect of these kinds of influences are also reflected in the hypotheses that one would 
develop if government information were more credible than industry information. The outlier 
is Low(g, i), because the relative information weight given to the industry's high risk assessment 
in this context is so large that the fraction of the informational content accorded to the govern- 
ment's low risk value is reduced, leading to a violation of the hypothesized dominance of 
government risk information. The expected large weight that government risk information 
should receive in the presence of industry risk information is consequently not borne out because 
of the substantial attention commanded by the industry's high risk assessment in a situation of 
conflicting risk viewpoints. Similarly, if government risk information were dominant, one would 
expect High(g, i) to be the smallest entry among the information combinations, whereas in fact, 
it is the largest because of the extreme weight that respondents place on the high risk estimate 
provided by industry when the other party providing risk information is the government. 
The situation in which industry information is more credible appears less plausible a priori 
and can also be rejected. The largest expected informational weight when industry risk infor- 
mation is dominant is for Low(i, g), which is close to being the smallest. 
Overall, the greatest departures from the predictions of the Bayesian learning model pertain 
to the context in which individuals receive information from different sources. In these contexts, 
the weight given to the high risk assessment is excessive given the informational content gen- 
erally accorded to that information source. In other respects, behavior is quite reasonable. In- 
dividuals display a responsiveness to the information provided, with positive information 
weights that sum to an amount that is not statistically distinguishable from 1.0. 
One should be cautious in making judgments concerning the rationality of this behavior. 
The information weights were not consistent with the naive Bayesian model, in which infor- 
mation from the same source was accorded a weight that was independent of the particular risk 
value. However, more complicated kinds of learning may be taking place. For example, the 
most extreme departure that was apparent is that high risk estimates by the polluting industry 
play a dominant role in situations in which the government provides the low risk assessment. 
Given the substantial financial interest that the polluting industry would have in not disclosing 
the high risk level, particularly when government officials believe that the risk is lower, one 
might conclude that the risk must in fact be quite large for the industry to make such a disclo- 
sure. What is implied by the results is that the characteristics of the learning process do not 
satisfy a learning model in which respondents treat the credibility of the risk information source 
as independent of the stated risk values. The informational context of the divergence of expert 
opinions plays an important role in influencing risk beliefs. 
4. Smoking Behavior, Personal Characteristics, and the Processing of Risk 
Information 
As a group, smokers face extremely high risks as part of their smoking activities, with 
lifetime smoking-related mortality risks on the order of 0.18-0.36 (Viscusi 1992b, p. 70). More- 
15 The pertinent F-values are 2.95 for the high risk weights and 4.40 for the low risk weights, where the critical Fo.o5(1837) 
value is 3.84. 
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over, these mortality risks are the subject of substantial public information efforts, both on the 
part of the government and the media. How do smokers think about risks in nonsmoking 
contexts? Examination of the risk perceptions of smokers and their responses to this experiment 
consequently may provide insight into whether smokers process risk information differently 
than do nonsmokers, where this process may also be at work in determining their smoking risk 
judgments. Smokers also may respond differently to risk information because they have smoked 
in a context in which there have been competing extreme informational claims, particularly with 
regard to the hazards of environmental tobacco smoke. This familiarity with self-interested 
information provision may affect how smokers interpret risk information more generally. 
The pooled information group results in Table 2 (column 2) indicate that, overall, smokers 
have lower risk perceptions. However, this specification forces the effect of smoking status into 
the constant term, which reflects prior beliefs, and does not permit smoking status to affect how 
the information is processed. Once the smoker-risk information interaction terms are included 
(Equation 3 of Table 2), smoking status alone is not influential in determining risk perceptions. 
Smokers do not have systematically lower risk beliefs because of lower prior risk assessments. 
Rather, their risk perceptions are lower because smokers place a lower weight on the high risk 
information provided to them. The mean effect of this difference is to decrease their risk per- 
ceptions by 33 cases of cancer per million, or 11% of the sample mean. A useful comparison 
is with actual smoker risk beliefs in the cigarette context. Smokers believe the lung cancer risks 
due to smoking are 14% lower than do nonsmokers, which is a similar discrepancy in the level 
of risk beliefs (Viscusi 1992b, p. 69). These lower smoking perceptions of smokers relative to 
nonsmokers also significantly increase the probability that these individuals smoke (Viscusi 
1992b, Chapter 5). Risk-taking activities such as smoking consequently reflect a self-selection 
phenomenon in which the people who assess the activity as being relatively safe will be more 
inclined to engage in it. Similar risk information processing in other domains also could account 
for smokers' greater proclivity to engage in high-risk activities more generally. Smokers, for 
example, are more likely to be injured at home, work on more hazardous jobs, are more likely 
to be injured at work (controlling for objective job risks), require less compensation to bear 
risk, and take fewer preventive actions (e.g., flossing one's teeth or checking one's blood pres- 
sure). 16 
To explore the role of smoking behavior in greater detail, Table 4 reports the interactions 
of these smoking status coefficients with the two risk information variables for each of the risk 
information subsamples. In the case of the g-g information combination, smokers place a lower 
weight on the high risk information presented to them, but not on the lower risk. The same is 
true of the i-i risk information combination. The only exception is that in which the source of 
the risk information is different. In the i-g case, smokers discount the industry's low risk 
information altogether and place a lower weight on it. Smokers place the same weight on the 
high risk information as do nonsmokers, but by discarding low risk information, smokers reduce 
the point estimates of their risk perceptions in the i-g case by 95 cancer cases per million, or 
31% of the sample mean. Taken at face value, this result would be consistent with the view 
that smokers dismiss industry reassurances when the government claims the risk is higher. This 
situation closely parallels real risk contexts in which government risk estimates are typically 
greater. Smokers also have a much lower risk perception overall for the i-i case. Smokers will 
16 See Hersch and Viscusi (1998) for documentation of these differences. 
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Table 4. Selected Coefficients for Risk Perception Regressions with Smoking Interactionsa 
Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
[Robust and Clustered Standard Errors] 
Government- Industry- Government- Industry- 
Government Industry Industry Government 
Low Risk 0.586* 0.432* 0.332* 0.448* 
(0.044) (0.047) (0.058) (0.073) 
[0.072] [0.085] [0.068] [0.065] 
High Risk 0.535* 0.596* 0.650* 0.534* 
(0.028) (0.035) (0.041) (0.048) 
[0.030] [0.057] [0.062] [0.051] 
Smoker 27.085 2.898 14.973 31.213 
(24.652) (27.289) (37.214) (41.421) 
[16.555] [17.449] [22.618] [52.607] 
Smoker x Low Risk 0.0009 0.108 -0.009 -0.517* 
(0.078) (0.085) (0.106) (0.159) 
[0.102] [0.091] [0.112] [0.380] 
Smoker x High Risk -0.133* -0.108* -0.033 0.090 
(0.054) (0.061) (0.076) (0.100) 
[0.073] [0.061] [0.105] [0.161] 
R2 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.80 
Asterisks denote coefficients that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, one-tailed test, using the 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. 
a Variables included in regression but not shown are age, age missing, nonwhite or other race, male, education, income, 
income missing, and single. 
have the same risk perception as nonsmokers in the g-i case, in which the industry believes 
the risks are higher than does the government, generally an atypical scenario. 
When there is a consensus in risk beliefs, smokers will discount the high risk assessment, 
and when industry assesses the risk as being lower than the government, smokers also have a 
very low posterior risk assessment. Somewhat strikingly, when the smoker variable does not 
interact with the risk information variables, it is never statistically significant (Table 4). Smokers 
do not differ significantly in their prior risk beliefs. The principal manner in which smokers 
differ from nonsmokers is not differences in prior beliefs, but rather differences in how they 
process the risk information they receive.17 
5. Conclusion 
Decisions involving risk are complicated and are associated with a wide variety of docu- 
mented anomalies in individual behavior. It is not surprising that when these decisions become 
17 Although smoking status is the key personal characteristic of policy interest, both marital status and race also were 
occasionally statistically significant variables as well. To distinguish whether these influences represent a difference in 
prior beliefs or the processing of information, the same statistical explorations undertaken above for smoking status 
were also undertaken for whether the respondent was single or nonwhite. In each case, the demographic dummy 
variables were insignificant. The only significant effect of single marital status is that single respondents place a smaller 
weight on the low risk assessment in the i-i information case. Nonwhite respondents place a greater weight on the low 
risk information in the i-g case. Differences in processing information seem to account for more risk perception 
differences than do differences in prior beliefs. 
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muddled further by the presence of conflicting risk judgments that people may not respond in 
a fully rational manner to the risk ambiguities that are present. This study explored individual 
risk judgments in the presence of conflicting risk information regarding the cancer risks from 
hazardous chemicals. The possibility that there might be differing views from industry and 
government scientists as well as different combinations thereof are reflected in a realistic por- 
trayal of the kinds of disparate information that people may receive in actual risk contexts. 
One way people might process conflicting risk information is to simply average expert 
beliefs, treating them as being equally credible. This symmetric treatment may be rational, but 
it is not a requirement for rationality. A more general formulation of rational learning is to treat 
each information source in a consistent manner, which is appropriate in a world of nonoverlap- 
ping information. Respondents might, for example, weight government risk studies more than 
industry studies. We designated this approach the "naive Bayesian" learning model. 
Many of the results were consistent with the predictions of the naive Bayesian learning 
model in which people weight the information based on its source and treat it as an independent 
source of risk information. At the most fundamental level, risk judgments increased in the 
expected direction with the risk assessments. Studies indicating higher risk levels boosted risk 
perceptions. The steepness of this relationship satisfied the usual properties of a rational learning 
process. The relative weights placed on the information, for example, sum to a value of ap- 
proximately 1.0. 
Some aspects of the behavior were not consistent with such a simplified learning model. 
These anomalies provide a cautionary warning for those providing risk information in situations 
where there is not a scientific consensus. In situations in which there are divergent risk judg- 
ments and where the identity of the parties is different, people are particularly likely to place 
the greatest weight on the worst case scenario. This undue emphasis on the worst case possibility 
is accentuated when there are different sources of risk information, as opposed to a single 
information source but with different risk estimates. People are particularly skeptical of low 
risk estimates from the polluting industry in situations in which the high risk estimate is from 
the government agency. This dismissal of industry risk information in this context may reflect 
the fact that people do not weight the industry risk information independent of the risk infor- 
mation context and the underlying economic incentives of the parties. When both of the risk 
assessments are from the industry, however, people are less likely to dismiss the industry low 
risk estimate. 
Situations in which experts differ are consequently likely to generate alarmist responses to 
dimly understood risks. These reactions in turn will create public pressures for stringent regu- 
lation. Regulators as individuals may be subject to the same biases, and to the extent that they 
are responding to political pressures from an alarmed public, these biases will be reinforced. 
The result, as is documented in Viscusi (1998), is that policies often reflect a variety of con- 
servative biases in which there is excessive regulation of imprecisely understood risks, compared 
to better known risks with higher mean risk values. This bias is a reflection of the same kinds 
of risk judgment biases found in our study. 
The behavior of cigarette smokers was particularly instructive because it afforded an op- 
portunity to assess how smokers process risk information and make risk judgments in another 
risk context. Controlling for other demographic characteristics, smoking status had an important 
influence on risk beliefs. It is noteworthy that smokers do not differ from nonsmokers by simply 
having lower prior probability values for the risk. There is not simply a difference in smokers' 
prior beliefs. Rather, they process risk information differently than do nonsmokers. Overall, 
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there is less of a tendency for nonsmokers to place a disproportionate weight on the high risk 
assessments they receive.18 Moreover, smokers are particularly likely to dismiss the low risk 
assessment by industry in situations in which the government is providing a higher risk value. 
This situation parallels many risk contexts in terms of the respective role of industry and 
government in providing divergent risk information estimates. 
Making judgments regarding the rationality of smokers' information processing is more 
problematic. If the behavior of nonsmokers serves as the rationality reference point, then smok- 
ers clearly fall short through their underestimation of risks. However, nonsmokers placed a 
disproportionate weight on the high risk assessments and had a more exaggerated response to 
risk information than would be predicted by a naive Bayesian learning model. Smokers' failure 
to integrate risk information in the same manner as nonsmokers is not necessarily evidence of 
irrationality. What is clear is that smokers are likely to process risk information in a manner 
that is less sensitive to the high risk estimates they receive, with the result being lower risk 
beliefs. This pattern of behavior for a nonsmoking risk context may explain in part why smokers 
believe that the risks of smoking are less than do nonsmokers.19 Moreover, it may also help 
account for the greater risk-taking behavior of smokers across a variety of domains of choice. 
Appendix 
Sample Description 
Individuals participating in the study were recruited by a professional market research firm at a mall intercept in 
Greensboro, North Carolina. This locale is not a university town and has demographic characteristics reflective of the 
U.S. population more generally (Table A1).20 The respondents were told that they would be participating in a Duke 
University study of city preferences. The sample for this study (Table Al) consisted of 143 adults. The mean sample age 
is 35 years old. Just under half of the sample is male, and the sample has an average of 13 years of education with an 
income of $28,000 per year.21 The survey was undertaken in the late summer and fall of 1993. 
Summary of Survey Questions 
Below, we provide a brief summary of the key sections of the survey used in this analysis. This summary indicates 
the survey structure and language but does not provide information on all the iterations that were used to obtain indif- 
ference because these questions varied depending on the particular respondent. The order of the risk information com- 
binations was rotated on a random basis. 
Each of the respondents focused on three of the four scenarios. In every scenario, government and industry experts 
agree on the exact risk in area 2, whereas the risk in area 1 was ambiguous. One scenario has a government expert and 
an industry expert to estimate the risk for area 1, the second scenario has only industry experts for area 1, and the final 
scenario has only government experts for area 1. Each subject answered two questions from each of the three scenarios 
for a total of six responses per subject. The following risk pairs were used randomized over the six questions: (100, 300), 
(200, 400), (100, 900), (10, 200), (80, 100), and (615, 715). 
18 Speculating on the reasons for this discrepancy is beyond the scope of this paper. Do smokers discount government 
information because they believe the government has overstated the risks of smoking? Or do these people smoke 
because they systematically ignore such warnings and underestimate the risk? 
19 For detailed statistics on the lung cancer and mortality risk beliefs of smokers and nonsmokers, see Viscusi (1992b). 
20 We explore the characteristics of the sample population at this locale in Viscusi and Magat (1987) and Magat and 
Viscusi (1992). For example, Greensboro is not a college town and is a frequent test marketing site used by companies 
and government agencies to assess public responses to new products and policies. 
21 Individuals who reported themselves as black or "other" races were oversampled relative to the U.S. population. 
Although the demographic controls will account for many of these differences, this sample is clearly not a nationally 
representative random sample. 
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Table Al. Summary of Sample Characteristics 
Variable 
Age (years) 
Age Missing (0-1 dummy variable [d.v.]) 
Nonwhite and Other (0-1 d.v.) 
Male (0-1 d.v.) 
Education (years) 
Income (in annual 1993 dollars) 
Income Missing (1-0 d.v.) 
Single (0-1 d.v.) 
Smoker (0-1 d.v. of current smoking status) 
Low Risk (per million population) 
High Risk (per million population) 
Sample Size 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
34.832 
(15.612) 
0.049 
(0.217) 
0.385 
(0.488) 
0.441 
(0.498) 
13.381 
(2.980) 
28,189 
(25,689) 
0.133 
(0.341) 
0.524 
(0.501) 
0.287 
(0.454) 
184.17 
(200.62) 
439.17 
(286.82) 
143 
The Survey 
Some chemical companies cause air pollution, and this air pollution can cause cancer. In other words, the factories that 
make chemicals can make the air unhealthy to breathe. 
Suppose that there are two chemical companies, one in area 1 and one in area 2. Both of these companies cause air 
pollution, and their air pollution can cause cancer. 
The company in area 1 is not exactly the same as the one in area 2, so the chance of getting cancer in each area is 
different. 
As we have done before, we will ask experts to estimate the chance of getting cancer from the pollution in each area. 
But this time we are going to tell you who the experts are. 
Some of the experts work for the government and some of the experts work for the companies that cause the pollution. 
For area 1, the government expert and the company expert DO NOT AGREE. That is, the government expert thinks the 
risk in area 1 is different than what the company expert thinks. 
A lot of research has been done in area 2, and the scientists have learned the exact risk of cancer from air pollution. The 
government expert and the company expert both agree on this number. 
The company in area 1 is not exactly the same as the one in area 2, so the chance of getting cancer in each area is 
different. 
As we have done before, we will ask experts to estimate the chance of getting cancer from the pollution in each area. 
But this time we are going to tell you who the experts are. 
Some of the experts work for the government and some of the experts work for the companies that cause the pollution. 
For area 1, the government expert and the company expert DO NOT AGREE. That is, the government expert thinks the 
risk in area 1 is different than what the company expert thinks. 
A lot of research has been done in area 2, and the scientists have learned the exact risk of cancer from air pollution. The 
government expert and the company expert both agree on this number. 
Smoking and Ambiguous Risk Evidence 
Your chance AREA 1 AREA 2 
in a million GOVERNMENT AND COMPANY 
of cancer GOVERNMENT EXPERT COMPANY EXPERT EXPERTS AGREE 
100 300 200 
If you had to make a choice, which area would you rather live in? 
1. AREA 1 2. AREA 2 
3. Both areas are the same to me 
Press the number that goes with your answer 
[suppose area 1 is chosen] 
Your chance AREA 1 AREA 2 
in a million GOVERNMENT AND COMPANY 
of cancer GOVERNMENT EXPERT COMPANY EXPERT EXPERTS AGREE 
100 300 200 
180 
YOU CHOSE AREA 1 
Suppose the risk in AREA 2 was lower than before, as shown by the new number above. 
If you had to make a choice, whick area would you rather live in? 
1. AREA 1 2. AREA 2 
3. Both areas are the same to me 
Press the number that goes with your answer 
Good! Press 0 for another question. 
Your chance AREA 1 AREA 2 
in a million GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
of cancer COMPANY EXPERT 1 COMPANY EXPERT 2 EXPERTS AGREE 
200 400 300 
THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ABOUT AREA 1. 
BOTH EXPERTS IN AREA 1 WORK FOR THE CHEMICAL COMPANIES. 
If you had to make a choice, which area would you rather live in? 
1. AREA 1 2. AREA 2 
3. Both areas are the same to me 
Press the number that goes with your answer 
[suppose area 2 is chosen] 
Your chance AREA 1 AREA 2 
in a million GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
of cancer COMPANY EXPERT 1 COMPANY EXPERT 2 EXPERTS AGREE 
200 400 300 
330 
YOU CHOSE AREA 2 
Suppose the risk in AREA 2 was higher than before, as shown by the new number above. 
If you had to make a choice, which area would you rather live in? 
1. AREA 1 2. AREA 2 
3. Both areas are the same to me 
Press the number that goes with your answer 
Good! Press 0 for another question. 
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Your chance AREA 1 AREA 2 
in a million GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
of cancer GOVERNMENT EXPERT 1 GOVERNMENT EXPERT 2 EXPERTS AGREE 
615 735 675 
THERE IS NO COMPANY INFORMATION ABOUT AREA 1. 
BOTH EXPERTS IN AREA 1 WORK FOR THE GOVERNMENT. 
If you had to make a choice, which area would you rather live in? 
1. AREA 1 2. AREA 2 
3. Both areas are the same to me 
Press the number that goes with your answer 
Your chance AREA 1 AREA 2 
in a million GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
of cancer GOVERNMENT EXPERT 1 GOVERNMENT EXPERT 2 EXPERTS AGREE 
615 735 675 
650 
YOU CHOSE AREA 1 
Suppose the risk in AREA 2 was lower than before, as shown by the new number above. 
If you had to make a choice, which area would you rather live in? 
1. AREA 1 2. AREA 2 
3. Both areas are the same to me 
Press the number that goes with your answer 
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